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CO-DEFENDANT CONFESSIONS
did not testify at trial. After the prosecution rested, Marsh was called to the stand and testified that on October 29, 1978, she had lost her wallet containing Martin's drug money at a shopping center. 25 Martin became angry and suggested that Marsh borrow money from Scott, a woman Marsh had worked with previously. 2 6 Martin and Marsh picked up Williams and began driving to Scott's house. 2 7 Marsh, who was in the back seat of the car, testified that she "knew that [Martin and Williams] were talking," but their words were inaudible because "the radio was on and the speaker was right in [her] ear." '28 Scott admitted Martin and Marsh into her home. During a brief conversation, Marsh asked Scott for a loan.
2 9 Martin then drew his gun as Marsh went to the door to locate the car. 3 0 Marsh then stated that she did not know why she stopped the Knightons from escaping and that "she did not feel free to leave and was too scared to flee." 3 1
Marsh, however, did testify that she took the grocery bag from Martin, but said she left the house without it after Williams and Martin took the victims into the basement. 3 2 Furthermore, Marsh insisted that she did not know that Williams and Martin had guns and that she never heard Williams or Martin talk about harming or killing Scott or the Knightons. 33 Although the prosecutor instructed the jury not to use Williams' confession against Marsh, 3 4 he nonetheless "linked [Marsh] to the portion of Williams' confession describing his conversation cence of Defendant Benjamin Williams. Under the rules already given to you, it must not be used or considered in any way against Defendant Clarissa Marsh. Marsh, 781 F.2d at 1203. 24 Williams. Her guilt, of course, is to be determined separately from the evidence but you may consider the same evidence that you heard from the witness stand. The only thing that the Court will instruct you that you cannot consider is that statement that was made by the Defendant Williams. You cannot consider that statement when you determine her guilt or innocence. To do so would be unfair. Marsh, 781 F.2d at 1203.
with Martin in the car" during his closing argument. 3 5 The jury found Marsh guilty of two counts of felony murder and one count of assault with the intent to commit murder. 3 6 The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, 3 7 and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. 38 Marsh subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 3 9 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, claiming that her constitutional rights to confrontation under the sixth amendment were violated when Williams' confession was admitted as evidence. 40 The court denied the petition. 41 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that "in determining whether Bruton bars the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession, a court must access the confession's 'inculpatory value' by examining not only the face of the confession, but also all of the evidence introduced at trial." 4 2 The Sixth Circuit also held that the conversation between Williams and Martin in the car as described in Williams' confession was the only direct evidence that Marsh knew of Martin's intentions to kill Scott 35 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1706. The prosecutor said: It's important in light of [respondent's] testimony when she says Kareem drives over to Benjamin Williams' home and picks him up to go over. What's the thing that she says? "Well, I'm sitting in the back seat of the car." "Did you hear any conversation that was going on in the front seat between Kareem and Mr. Williams?" "No, couldn't hear any conversation. The radio was too loud." I asked [sic] you whether that is reasonable. Why did she say she couldn't hear any conversation? She said, "I know they were having conversation but I couldn't hear it because of the radio." Because if she admits that she heard the conversation and she admits to the plan, she's guilty of at least armed robbery. So she can't tell you that. Id. at 1706 n.2. Marsh's attorney did not object to the prosecutor's closing argument. Id. at 1706. 36 Id. at 1706. 37 No. 46128 (Dec. 17, 1980) . The Michigan Court of Appeals found that malice could be inferred because Marsh guarded the door, prevented the Knightons' escape, and held the grocery bag containing the money. The Michigan Court of Appeals stated:
A split of opinion still exists on this Court over the issue of whether, in a felonymurder case, malice may be imputed from the underlying felony or merely inferred from the circumstances surrounding the killing, including the underlying felony .... We believe Fountain presents the better view and hold that malice may not be imputed, as a matter of law, from the underlying felony. Accordingly, the evidence presented at the time of the motion had to sufficiently show that Williams acted with the intent to kill or in reckless disregard of a known and high degree of risk that death or serious bodily harm might occur.... [T] he evidence indicated that Marsh knowingly participated in an armed robbery in reckless disregard of circumstances that indicated a high degree of risk that death or serious bodily harm could result. which have declined to adopt the "evidentiary linkage" or "contextual implication" approach to Bruton issues. In writing for the majority, 5 0 Justice Scalia argued that the present case did not fall within the exception created in Bruton. 5 1 The majority noted that in Bruton the defendant was expressly named in the co-defendant's confession while in the present case, the confession was not facially incriminating against Marsh and only became so later at trial when other evidence was properly introduced. 5 2 Justice Scalia concluded that a jury is less likely to disobey instructions to disregard the evidence when it is required to make an inferential linkage between the confession and other evidence introduced at trial than it would if the confession was facially incriminating against the defendant. Justice Scalia began his opinion for the Court by briefly describing the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. 54 The majority noted that the "right of confrontation includes the right to crossexamine witnesses," 55 and, thus, at ajoint trial, the pre-trial confes- sion of a nontestifying co-defendant cannot be admitted as evidence against the defendant. 56 The Court also observed that the general rule in joint trials is that "a witness whose testimony is introduced ... is not considered to be a witness 'against' a defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony only against a codefendant" 5 7 because juries are assumed to follow the judge's instructions. 58 Justice Scalia then noted that the Bruton Court had held that the testimony of a nontestifying co-defendant at a joint trial which expressly implicates the defendant is a violation of the defendant's rights under the confrontation clause even if the jury is charged to disregard the confession as to the defendant. 5 9 The majority argued that this holding was a narrow exception to the general rule that jurors follow their instructions. 6 0 Justifying the Bruton exception, the Court stated:
" [T] here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial."
Justice Scalia added that the co-defendant's confession in Bruton was "powerfully incriminating" against the defendant because the confession "expressly implicat[ed]" the defendant as an accomplice.
62
The majority next distinguished Bruton from Richardson, assert- 414-16 (1985) (instructions were given to the jury to consider accomplice's confession against the defendant only to determine the truthfulness of the defendant's assertion that his own confession was coerced); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438-39 n.6 (1983); Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981)(instructions were given to the jury to disregard eyewitness identification that was erroneously admitted at trial); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)(statements coerced from the defendant which are inadmissable as to the defendant's guilt because of a Miranda violation can be used to impeach the defendant's credibility as long as the jury is instructed properly); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967)(evidence of prior convictions can be introduced for sentence enhancement if the jury is instructed that this evidence is not to be used to determine the defendant's guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)(instructions were given to the jury to assess unlawfully seized evidence only to determine the defendant's credibility). 
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ing that "in this case the confession was not incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial (the defendant's own testimony)." 63 Justice Scalia reasoned that a jury is less likely to disregard its instructions when it has to make a linkage of this sort between the confession and other evidence at trial. 64 The majority added that ajury may be unable to disregard the confession if it contained testimony that "the defendant helped me commit the crime" because this type of testimony is "more vivid than inferential incrimination, and hence more difficult to thrust out of mind." 65 On the other hand, although it may be difficult at times forjurors to disregard the co-defendant's testimony as to the defendant, the majority concluded that "there does not exist the overwhelming probability of their inability to do so that is the foundation of Bruton's exception to the general rule."
66
The Court added that if the Bruton exception is limited to "facially incriminating" confessions, it could still be complied with by redaction, "a possibility suggested in that opinion itself."
However, if Bruton were extended to include confessions which incriminate the defendant by contextual linkage, the majority warned that the trial judge would be unable to rule on the admissibility of the confession until after the trial ended. 68 This, Justice Scalia claimed, would lead to manipulation by the defense attorney and, at the very least, to numerous mistrials. 69 In response to the suggestion that the trial judge make a Bruton analysis at a pre-trial hearing in which both parties introduce their evidence to the judge, the opinion noted that this approach would probably not be possible under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 70 and, even if it 63 Id. at 1707. Justice Scalia added that the dissent had misconstrued the decision in saying that the majority "assume [d] If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other reliefjustice requires. In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the government to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or confes-were, it would be "time consuming and obviously far from foolproof.
1
Justice Scalia continued by arguing that ordering separate trials for each defendant is also not a feasible solution. 7 2 The majority noted that joint trials have been utilized in almost one-third of the federal criminal trials in the past five years, 73 and they often prevent inconsistent and inequitable verdicts. 7 4 Many joint trials have numerous defendants, one or more of whom are likely to confess. 75 Justice Scalia argued that to require separate trials in every case in which an incriminating confession was made would not only be inefficient but also unfair. 76 The majority opinion claimed that the prosecution would have to present the same evidence at each trial, "requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying" 77 and giving "the last-tried defendants . . . the advantage of knowing the prosecution's case beforehand." 78 In response to the suggestion that the prosecution forego the use of a co-defendant's incriminating confession in joint trials, Justice Scalia asserted that this "price is also too high" 79 because confessions " 'are more than merely desirable; they are essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.' o80 The Court disagreed with the dissent's assertion that "[flederal prosecutors seem to have had little difficulty" 8 1 implementing the dissent's view of Bruton. The dissent reached this conclusion from the fact that the only cases before this Court since Bruton were those that originated in a state court. 8 2 Justice Scalia stated that because the number of cases was so small, "the fact that they happened to be state cases may signify nothing more than that there are many times sions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 14. Justice Scalia apparently believes that such a pre-trial hearing would violate this rule because this rule limits the review of evidence introduced before trial to an in camera inspection. 
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more state prosecutions than federal." ' 3 The majority argued that the brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Richardson is also evidence that federal prosecutors consider the dissent's interpretation of Bruton as harmful to law enforcement efforts.
4
Justice Scalia concluded by noting that the premise that juries follow their instructions is "rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process." 8 5 The majority stressed that Bruton was an exception to this rule, 8 6 and it should not be extended to situations in which "the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any reference to her existence." 8 7 However, since the prosecutor during his closing argument attempted to subvert "the limiting instructions by urging the jury to use Williams' confession in evaluating Marsh's case," 8 8 Justice Scalia held that the case should be remanded to consider whether a writ of habeas corpus should be granted even though Marsh did not object to the prosecutor's remarks at trial. 8 9
B.
DISSENTING OPINION Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's opinion. 90 Justice Stevens concluded that Bruton should apply to any inadmissible confession by a co-defendant that is "powerfully incriminating" against the defendant. 9 1 The dissent argued that the Court drew "a distinction of constitutional magnitude" between confessions that are facially incriminating and confessions that are incriminating by linkage to other evidence. 92 Justice Stevens noted that, according to the majority opinion, the exclusion of a statement would be based on this distinction even though the indirectly incriminating confession may be more damaging to the defendant's case than the facially incriminating confession. 93 The dissent also criticized the Court, as- serting that "neither reason nor experience supports the Court's argument that a consistent application of the rationale of the Bruton case would impose unacceptable burdens on the administration of justice."
Justice Stevens began his analysis by arguing that certain kinds of hearsay " 'are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such evidence the minimal weight it logically deserves, whatever instructions the trial judge must give.' 95 The dissenting opinion then reasoned that this principle was applicable to the Richardson facts. 96 Justice Stevens agreed with the majority opinion that a jury is less likely to disobey instructions to disregard the confession if the confession only incriminates the defendant by implication, rather than directly. 9 7 However, the dissent argued that Bruton did not mandate the exclusion of all co-defendant confessions lacking the defendant's name. 98 Rather, Justice Stevens argued that confessions that do not expressly name the defendant should be excluded on occasion because some of these confessions may be devastating to the 94 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 95 Id. at 1710 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 138 (Stewart, J., concurring)(emphasis in original)). Justice Stevens added thatJudge Learned Hand and Justice Frankfurter have also supported this view. Id. at 1710 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As the Bruton Court noted, Judge Hand found that the limiting instruction is a " 'recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else,' Nash v. 1956 ]. Judge Hand referred to the instruction as a 'placebo,' medically defined as a 'medicinal lie.'" Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1710 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 132 n.8). Justice Frankfurter observed that " '[t]he Government should not have the windfall of having the jury be influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a matter of law, they should not consider but which they cannot put out of their minds.' " Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 248 (1957)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 96 Id. at 1710 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that the Bruton Court framed the issue as " 'whether the conviction of a defendant at ajoint trial should be set aside although the jury was instructed that a codefendant's confession inculpating the defendant had to be disregarded in determining his guilt or innocence.' " Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 123-24). Justice Stevens added that the Bruton Court answered that question in the affirmative, noting that a sixth amendment violation occurs "'where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a co-defendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial.' " Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36). 97 Id. at 1710 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 98 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 78 defendant's case. 99 On the other hand, some confessions expressly naming the defendant need not be excluded because they do not prejudice the defendant at all.' 0 0 The dissent argued that despite proper limiting instructions, "the very act of listening and seeing will sometimes lead them [the jury] down the 'path of inference.' "101 Justice Stevens pointed out that the Court is only speculating that the limiting instructions will dissuade the jury from considering the confession against the defendant. 0 2 The dissent argued that, according to Bruton, the determination of whether a confession is deemed "powerfully incriminating" should be made on a case-by-case basis and should not be dependent on whether or not the defendant was named in the confession.' 0 3
Justice Stevens next argued that Marsh's rights under the confrontation clause were violated because at the time Williams' confession was introduced at trial, the prosecutor clearly indicated that the confession would incriminate both Williams and Marsh. 1 0 4 The dissent noted that the evidence had already shown that Marsh was at Scott's home when the crimes occurred. 1 0 5 However, the evidence was not as clear on the issue of "whether respondent herself intended to commit a robbery in which murder was a foreseeable result, or knew that the two men planned to do so." 106 Justice Stevens reiterated that Williams' confession included Martin's statement to Williams in the car that "he would have to 106 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens observed that the "quantum of evidence admissible against respondent was just sufficient to establish this intent and hence support her conviction." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). As the Sixth Circuit explained:
"jT]he issue is whether the evidence was sufficient to show that Marsh aided and abetted the assault with the specific intent to murder Knighton or with the knowledge that Martin had this specific intent .... Marsh's case presents a much closer question on this issue than does Williams'. There was no testimony indicating she harbored an intent to murder Knighton, nor was there any showing that she heard Martin's statements regarding the need to 'hurt' or 'take out' the victims. There was, in addition, no testimony placing her in the basement, the scene of the shootings. The evidence does indicate, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, that she was aware that Williams and Martin were armed, that she served as a guard or 'lookout' at the door, that she prevented an attempted escape by Knighton, and that she was given the paper bag thought to contain the proceeds of a robbery. The evidence also indicates that Marsh knew Scott, supporting the inference that it was Marsh who allowed Martin to gain entrance. While it is a close question, we believe the evidence presented at the time of the motion was sufficient to survive a motion for directed verdict."
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Marsh, 781 F.2d at 1204).
take them out after the robbery."' 1 0 7 In addition, the dissent noted that Knighton testified that Marsh and Martin arrived at Scott's house together. 1 0 8 Thus, Justice Stevens reasoned that the jury could not avoid the inference that Marsh was in the car and had heard the conversation. 1 0 9 The dissent next argued that the confession was "of critical importance because it was the only evidence directly linking respondent with the specific intent, expressed before the robbery, to kill the victims afterwards." 11 0 Justice Stevens criticized the majority opinion for assuming that Williams' confession did not incriminate Marsh, stating that "[it is unrealistic to believe that the jury would assume that respondent did not accompany the two men in the car but had just magically appeared at the front door of the apartment at the same time that Martin did."' 1 11
Since Williams did not take the stand, Justice Stevens noted that Marsh's lawyer did not have a chance to cross-examine Williams to establish that the radio may have been too loud for Marsh to hear the conversation with Martin. 112 Thus, the dissent argued that Marsh had to try "to rebut the obvious inference that she had overheard Martin," giving the prosecutor yet one more chance "to point to this most damaging evidence on the close question of her specific intent." ' 1 3 Justice Stevens asserted that the fact that the confession was not facially incriminating against Marsh but rather incriminating only when considered in light of the other evidence "does not eliminate their common, substantial, and constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury, when resolving a critical issue against respondent, may have relied on impermissible evidence." 114 Justice Stevens added thatJustice White's dissenting opinion in Bruton did not interpret the Bruton majority opinion to include only facially incriminating confessions:115 "I would suppose that it will be necessary to exclude all extrajudicial confessions unless all portions of them which implicate defendants other than the declarant are effectively deleted. The dissent continued by analyzing the role ofjoint trials in the administration of criminal trials."1 8 Justice Stevens admitted that "joint trials conserve prosecutorial resources, diminish inconvenience to witnesses, and avoid delays in the administration of criminal justice." 1 19 However, the dissent added that if a joint trial creates "special risks of prejudice to one of the defendants," a severance must be granted.' 20 Justice Stevens criticized the government's assertion that the costs to the state of using a severence instead of a co-defendant's confession outweigh the benefits to the defendant' 2 '
by noting that "on the scales ofjustice... considerations of fairness normally outweigh administrative concerns."'
122
The dissent noted that the United States made a similar argument in Bruton. 123 QuotingJudge Lehman of the New York Court of Appeals, the Bruton Court responded to these administrative concerns by saying:
"We still adhere to the rule that an accused is entitled to confrontation of the witnesses against him and the right to cross-examine them.... We destroy the age-old rule which in the past has been regarded as a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence by a legalistic formula, required of the judge, that the jury may not consider any admissions against any party who did not join in them. We secure greater speed, economy and convenience in the administration of the law at the price of fundamental principles of constitutional liberty. That price is too 
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sertion that joint trials account for "almost one-third of federal criminal trials in the past five years," the dissent highlighted the Court's lack of precision by noting that "the Court might have stated that there were 10,904 federal criminal trials involving more than one defendant during that 5 year period." 12 6 Justice Stevens added that the data did not specify how many of the joint trials contained confessions by one of the defendants.
27
Justice Stevens continued his criticism of the majority by stating that all cases before the Court in which the Bruton rule was at issue originated in a state court. 128 The dissent, therefore, reasoned that federal prosecutors, presumably through "the options of granting immunity, making plea bargains, or simply waiting until after a confessing defendant has been tried separately before trying to use his admissions against an accomplice," have been able to avoid "the great harm to the criminal justice system" 1 29 that the Court asserts will occur if the Bruton rule is extended to the facts of this case.
Justice Stevens labeled the Court's assertion, that the number of cases containing a co-defendant's confession which does not facially incriminate the defendant is too great to evaluate on a caseby-case basis, a declaration that "floats unattached to any anchor of reality." 1 30 Because the number of cases in which more than one co-defendant confesses is small, the dissent reasoned that the Court's concern of "presenting the same evidence again and again" is "nothing but a rhetorical flourish" 1 3 ' because most cases would require at most two trials, one for the confessing defendant and one for the other defendant or defendants. 13 2 Furthermore, Justice Stevens commented that a joint trial can often be avoided because "most confessing defendants are likely candidates for plea bargaining."1 3 3
In response to the Court's belief that trial judges will be unable to determine if a co-defendant's non-facially incriminating confession unfairly prejudices the defendant, Justice Stevens argued that the judge will have no problem making this evaluation after the 
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prosecution rests.1 3 4 Furthermore, the dissent criticized the Court's assertion that if Bruton is extended to encompass the facts of this case, the result will lead to "manipulation by the defense."' i 5 Justice Stevens explained that the Court presumably meant that a defense attorney might "tailor [the] evidence to make sure that a confession which does not directly mention the defendant is deemed powerfully incriminating when viewed in light of the prosecution's entire case." 13 6 Justice Stevens expressed doubt that defense attorneys would "pursue this high-risk strategy of 'manipulating' [the] .. . evidence" to increase the inculpatory value of the confession against their clients.' 3 7 The dissent added that trial judges are very capable of controlling "problems that seem insurmountable to appellate judges who are sometimes distracted by illogical distinctions and irrelevant statistics."' 1 3 8 Justice Stevens closed by stating that other than Williams' confession and the prosecutor's remarks at closing argument, which will be treated separately on remand, "there was a paucity of other evidence" connecting Marsh to Martin's statement in the car indicating his intent to kill the victims. 13 9 Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that the Sixth Circuit was correct in deciding that this specific violation of the confrontation clause was not a harmless error.
140

IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Included in the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is the right of an accused criminal defendant to cross-examine any witness who testifies against him. 14 a non-testifying co-defendant's confession is admitted into evidence, even if the confession makes reference to the defendant, as long as the jury is instructed to disregard the confession in determining the defendant's guilt. 14 5 The Court in Delli Paoli based its holding on the long-standing premise that it is reasonably possible for juries to follow sufficiently clear instructions. 46 In Bruton v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected this argument and expressly overruled Delli Paoli, using principles underlying the confrontation clause. 1 4 7 In Bruton, the co-defendant gave a postarrest confession which expressly implicated the defendant. 14 8 Because the co-defendant did not testify at the joint trial, a postal inspector testified regarding the confession. 4 9 The trial judge instructed the jury to disregard the co-defendant's confession in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence because the confession was inadmissible hearsay against the defendant.' 50 The Bruton Court noted that if the jury did disregard the co-defendant's confession as to the defendant, no confrontation clause question would arise because the situation would be as if the co-defendant made no statement at all inculpating the defendant. 15 ' However, the Court held that the admission of the co-defendant's confession violated the defendant's rights under the confrontation clause because there was a substantial risk that the jury would use the co-defendant's confession in determining the guilt of the defendant despite the limiting instruction. 147 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126. 148 Id. at 124. 149 Id. 150 Id. at 125. The Bruton Court stressed that the co-defendant's confession was clearly inadmissible evidence against the defendant under traditional rules of evidence. Id. at 128 n.3 (citing Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 442-43, 443-44 (1948) (holding that the co-conspirator's hearsay declaration was not admissible because it was made in furtherance of the conspiracy to transport a woman for the purposes of prostitution and because it was made in furtherance of a continuing subsidiary phase of the conspiracy); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217 (1946) (holding that the confession of a co-conspirator after he was apprehended ended the conspiracy and rendered his confession inadmissible against his co-conspirator)). The Bruton Court cited several authorities to support this proposition, including C. MCCORMICK 
B. BRUTON'S "POWERFULLY INCRIMINATING" STANDARD
In Richardson v. Marsh, Justice Scalia concluded that no Bruton violation existed because Williams' confession was redacted and all references to Marsh were omitted. 158 The majority concluded that Williams' confession was not "facially incriminating" against Marsh, as was the case in Bruton. 15 9 Even though Williams' confession inculpated Marsh when combined with other evidence properly introduced at trial, Justice Scalia held that Marsh's rights were not violated under the confrontation clause because Marsh was not implicated by' the confession alone. 160 A careful analysis of Bruton reveals, however, that the majority's interpretation of Bruton is erroneous, as Bruton was not based on this "facially incriminating" distinction.
Although the co-defendant's confession in Bruton did "facially incriminate" the defendant, the Bruton Court did not use this rationale to determine the standard for confrontation clause violations. 16 1 Rather, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Bruton, articulated the standard in more general terms:
[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure Thus, the Bruton Court held that the confrontation clause requires a per se rule excluding the confession of a co-defendant if the defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine the co-defendant and if the confession is so "powerfully incriminating" against the defendant that any limiting instruction given to the jury would be ineffective.1 6 3
In Richardson, the first criterion set forth in Bruton was clearly satisfied because Williams' confession was inadmissible hearsay against Marsh under the Federal Rules of Evidence' 64 and because Williams did not take the stand. However, the majority incorrectly interpreted the second criterion of "powerfully incriminating" to mean "facially incriminating."' 16 5 Justice Scalia remarked that "[o]n the precise facts of Bruton, involving a facially incriminating confession, we found [the rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions] inadequate. . . . [T] he calculus changes when confessions that do not name the defendant are at issue."' 166 Thus, the majority would exclude all evidence from sixth amendment protection other than facially inculpatory co-defendant confessions, regardless of the incriminating effect on the defendant. 167 Clearly, Justice Scalia's conclusion that a confession can only be "powerfully incriminating" if it facially incriminates the defendant blatantly ignores the express language of the Bruton opinion and its precedents.
Justice Brennan laid the foundation for the "powerfully incriminating" standard of Bruton for co-defendant confessions in Douglas v. 162 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36 (citations omitted). Alabama. 168 In Douglas, the defendant and an alleged accomplice were tried separately for assault with the intent to murder. 169 The alleged accomplice was tried first and found guilty. 170 The state called the accomplice to testify at the defendant's trial. 17 ' However, the accomplice refused to answer any questions on grounds of selfincrimination because an appeal on his conviction was pending.
2
The trial judge thus allowed the prosecution to treat the accomplice as a hostile witness. 17 3 The prosecutor subsequently read the accomplice's purported confession which implicated the defendant and asked the accomplice to affirm or deny the statements. 174 Once again, the accomplice refused to respond. 175 The Court noted:
The alleged statements clearly bore on a fundamental part of the State's case against the petitioner. The circumstances are therefore such that "inferences from a witness' refusal to answer added critical weight to the prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, and thus unfairly prejudiced the defendant."'
176
The Court thus held that the defendant's inability to cross-examine the accomplice about the confession violated his confrontation right under the sixth amendment.
177
Relying on Douglas, Justice Brennan noted in Bruton that the risk of prejudice to the defendant was even more serious than it was in Douglas. l78 Justice Brennan argued that the co-defendant's confession "added substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the Government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, since [the co-defendant] ... did not take the stand. [The defendant] ... thus was denied his constitutional right of confrontation."' 179 Although Douglas and Bruton involved confessions which facially incriminated the defendants, Justice Brennan did not limit confrontation clause violations to only those statements.1 8 0 Rather, any confession which added substantial weight to the prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-examination would be deemed "powerfully incrimi-168 380 U.S. 415 (1965 nating." In Richardson, Justice Stevens correctly argued that a codefendant's confession which implicates the defendant when combined with other evidence at trial certainly may add substantial weight to the government's case just as easily as a confession which directly implicates the defendant.' 8 ' This is especially true if the government's case is based primarily on circumstantial evidence. To hold that such linkage testimony does not violate the confrontation clause "ignores the true incriminating effect of the statement."1 8 2
Moreover, Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Bruton also adhered to the proposition that "powerfully incriminating" is not limited to facially incriminating confessions. Justice Stewart noted that "the underlying rationale of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause precludes reliance upon cautionary instructions when the highly damaging out-of-court statements of a codefendant, who is not subject to cross-examination, is deliberately placed before the jury at a joint trial."' 1 3 Although Justice Stewart's choice of words was slightly different from that of Justice Brennan, the meaning is the same: a co-defendant's confession is "powerfully incriminating" if it is highly damaging or adds substantial weight to the government's case.
Indeed, even Justice White, in his dissent in Bruton, agreed that Justice Brennan did not intend to limit "powerfully incriminating" confessions to "facially incriminating" confessions.' 8 4 Justice White noted:
I would suppose that it will be necessary to exclude all extrajudicial confessions unless all portions of them which implicate defendants other than the declarant are effectively deleted. Effective deletion will probably require not only omission of all direct and indirect inculpations of codefendants but also of any statement that could be employed against those defendants once their identity is otherwise established.1 8 5
Justice White's dissenting opinion is highly significant because neither the majority opinion nor the concurring opinion in Bruton discussed the effects the decision would have on the redaction process. Because Justice White was dissenting, his views may represent the minimum standard that the prosecution will have to satisfy in order to comply with Bruton.' 8 6 Justice White nonetheless correctly asserted that under the majority opinion, a confession would still be powerfully incriminating unless all statements which incriminated the defendant, direct or otherwise, were deleted from the confession. Justice Scalia disagreed that redaction was discussed only in Justice White's dissent, asserting that the majority opinion in Bruton suggested that the principles of Bruton could be complied with by redaction.' 8 7 Such a statement is misleading. The Court's exact words in Bruton were: "Some courts have required deletions of reference to codefendants where practicable."' ' 8 8 Such a statement hardly implies that a redaction which omits all express reference to the defendant will always protect the defendant's rights guaranteed by the confrontation clause. In fact, the Court specifically cited authorities criticizing redactions. 8 9 In Richardson, even though Williams' confession made no reference to Marsh, the redaction was still ineffective because the confession inculpated Marsh when it was combined with other evidence introduced at trial. Since Williams' confession was the only evidence that indicated that Marsh may have known of Martin's intent to kill the victims, the confession added substantial weight to the state's case. Thus, in light of the rest of the opinion, the majority in Bruton would not consider a redaction that omitted all reference to the defendant to be practicable if the confession was still "powerfully incriminating" against the defendant.
C. THE "FACIALLY INCRIMINATING" STANDARD
In addition to disregarding the express language in Bruton, the majority opinion in Richardson creates illogical results and ignores the values of the confrontation clause that Bruton sought to protect. As Justice Stevens noted in Richardson, the result of using Justice Scalia's "facially incriminating" standard is that even if a jury's indirect inference from a co-defendant's confession is much more devastating than an inference from a direct reference in the confession, only the latter statement would be excluded.' 90 The Bruton Court clearly could not have intended such an illogical result. As the Court concluded in Pointer v. Texas, 19 ' the purpose of the confrontation clause is to protect a criminal defendant from being unfairly 187 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1708. 188 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 134 n.10. prejudiced by evidence which is inadmissible against him. 19 2 A nonfacially incriminating confession may certainly unfairly prejudice the defendant as much as a facially incriminating confession. Justice Stevens was, therefore, correct when he stated that the determination of whether a co-defendant's confession violates the confrontation clause should not be dependent upon whether the defendant is named in the confession, but rather should be made on a case-bycase basis dependent upon whether the confession is "powerfully incriminating."
Furthermore, Justice Scalia's "facially incriminating" standard is flawed because it ignores the elements of the jury's decision-making process. Juries are instructed not to form conclusions until all the evidence is introduced, thus giving the jury the opportunity to view each piece of evidence in the context of the entire case. 194 Consequently, a piece of inadmissible evidence which inculpates the defendant when linked with other evidence at trial may still have a devastating effect against the defendant even though it is not facially incriminating. Justice Stevens correctly noted that "the very acts of listening and seeing will sometimes lead them [the jury] down 'the path of inference.' " 195 As the Bruton Court noted, if the testimony adds substantial weight to the state's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, "the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored."' 96 Indeed, the facts of Richardson are a perfect example of the problems created by the majority's "facially incriminating" distinction. Because Williams' confession was not facially incriminating as to Marsh, Justice Scalia reasoned that it did not violate Marsh's rights under the confrontation clause.' 9 7 However, at the time Williams' confession was introduced, Knighton's testimony had already established that Marsh, Williams, and Martin had committed an armed robbery at Scott's house and that Martin and Marsh had arrived together.1 9 8 Justice Stevens correctly reasoned that the jury could not help but infer that Marsh was in the car and had heard Martin's statement indicating his intent to kill Scott and the Knight-ons. 199 Williams' confession certainly added substantial weight to the state's case and thus made it powerfully incriminating against Marsh because it was the only evidence at trial that indicated that Marsh may have known of Martin's intent to kill the victims. 2 0 0 In addition, because Williams did not testify at trial, Marsh's attorney had no opportunity to cross-examine him to establish that the radio may have been too loud for Marsh to hear Martin's statement. 20 1 Thus, Justice Stevens was correct in concluding that the introduction of Williams' confession was a violation of the confrontation clause even though the confession did not facially incriminate Marsh.
D. THE ADMINISTRATIVE ARGUMENTS IN RICHARDSON
Justice Scalia further tried to justify his "facially incriminating" distiction by noting that " [w] here the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the evidence. '20 2 However, the majority cites no authority to support this conclusion. As noted above, this conclusion was specifically incorrect in Richardson because Williams' confession added substantial weight to the state's case in a form not subject to cross-examination. Furthermore, Justice Scalia's choice of words indicated the clear lack of certainty he has for this proposition. By using phrases such as "the judge's instruction may well be successful in dissuading the jury from entering onto the path of inference in the first place.. ." and "there does not exist the overwhelming probability [that the jury will obey their limiting instructions]," Justice Scalia showed that he was far from certain about his conclusion. 20 3 In addition, Justice Scalia actually admitted to the logical weakness of his proposition and tried to rationalize his conclusion by using administrative arguments. The majority stated that
[t]he rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process.
that the costs of requiring the prosecution to use separate trials or foregoing the use of the co-defendant's confession outweigh the benefits to the defendant. 20 5 It is true that joint trials "conserve prosecutorial resources, diminish inconvenience to witnesses, and avoid delays in the administration of criminal justice. " 20 6 However, to allow administrative concerns to prevail at the expense of fairness and justice protected by the confrontation clause would be a dangerous practice. Justice Stevens correctly argued that the criminal justice system pays too high a price when it protects " 'greater speed, economy and convenience in the administration of the law at the price of fundamental principles of constitutional liberty.' " 207 Although Justice Scalia and the state would prefer smoother administration in the criminal justice system at the expense of a fair trial for the defendant, the Constitution does not tolerate such a result.
8
Moreover, even if administrative issues are given more weight than constitutional rights, Justice Scalia's concerns about administrative burdens on the criminal justice system are without merit. The majority fears that a "contextual implication" reading of Bruton will lead to mid-trial manipulation by defense attorneys. 20 9 Justice Scalia presumably meant that a defense attorney may try to alter the evidence at trial in order to create a powerfully incriminating inference against his or her client. 2 10 This argument, however, ignores the realities of a criminal trial. As Justice Stevens argued, there are few defense attorneys who would pursue this high risk strategy of manipulating their evidence to create a powerfully incriminating inference if their client has any chance of acquittal. 2 11 Even if a defense attorney did try to manipulate the evidence, Justice Stevens correctly noted that trial judges are fully capable of "supervising counsel in order to avoid problems that seem insurmountable to appellate judges." 2 1 2 Furthermore, if the state had an exceptionally strong case against the defendant, the defense would not benefit by manipulating the evidence to create a powerfully incriminating inference because any Bruton violation would be deemed a harmless error.
13
Justice Scalia further argued that reading Bruton to encompass "contextual linkage" confessions would be needlessly time-consuming and would lead to a trial before trial. 2 14 Other critics have stressed that such a reading of Bruton would all but eliminate the use ofjoint trials by forcing the state to expose its entire case on a motion for severence. 21 5 These assertions are without merit. At most, trial courts would have to survey the co-defendant's statements and order production of only those statements which could provide contextual linkage evidence. 216 Trial judges are well-equipped and thoroughly familiar with complex discovery procedures. There is no reason to believe they will have any more difficulty deciding this issue than they would have with any other evidentiary matter. 21 7 In any event, even if the "contextual implication" reading of Bruton does result in fewer joint trials and less efficiency in the criminal justice system, this price is small compared to the consequences arising from the jeopardizing of an individual's constitutional rights of confrontation under the sixth amendment.
Indeed, the prosecutor has a duty to request a severance in any Bruton situation in which the defendant's confrontation rights are threatened. Justice Scalia's argument conveniently ignores this duty to provide the defendant with a fair trial. 218 In Berger v. United States, 21 9 the Supreme Court stated:
The United States attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done ....
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
20
Thus, when a redacted confession implicates the defendant even though the confession is not facially incriminating, the prosecutor is under a duty either to request a severence or to seek alternative measures.
Two such viable alternatives to traditional joint trials that Justice Scalia failed to recognize are bifurcation and multiplejuries. In a bifurcated trial, the jury is permitted to hear all of the evidence against the defendant except for the co-defendant's confession. After the jury hears closing arguments and reaches a verdict as to the defendant, the trial judge then informs the jury about the co-defendant's confession. The jury is then allowed to hear the complete confession and any other evidence pertinent to the co-defendant's case.
22 1 Bifurcation thus grants the prosecution the value of the codefendant's confession against the co-defendant and, at the same time, protects the confrontation rights of the defendant. In a single trial, multiple jury procedure, a jury is chosen for each co-defendant. The jury for the defendant is excused when the co-defendant's confession or any evidence relating to the confession is introduced at trial. The juries hear separate closing arguments and subsequently render separate verdicts. 22 2 Similar to bifurcation, a multiple jury procedure enables the prosecution to use the confession against the co-defendant, yet sufficiently protects the defendant from unfair prejudice. These two methods, therefore, successfully achieve a balance between the interests of the state and the defendant. The state obtains the same "speed, economy, and convenience" that it would normally obtain in a traditional joint trial, while defendant than a confession which expressly names the defendant because the former draws the special attention of the jurors, and their tendency to fill in the blank makes it even harder for them to disregard the confession. 227 Thus, a confession that replaces the defendant's name with a symbol or pronoun is still "facially incriminating" even though it does not expressly refer to the defendant's name.
V. CONCLUSION
In Richardson v. Marsh, the Supreme Court significantly limited the scope of Bruton v. United States. The Court held that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying co-defendant's confession with proper limiting instructions when all references to the defendant are removed from the confession, even if the confession inculpates the defendant when linked with other evidence introduced at trial.
According to the Court, such a confession need not be excluded under Bruton because Bruton was only intended to apply to co-defendant confessions which "facially incriminate" the defendant. The Court rationalized this interpretation by asserting that a jury will be able to follow its limiting instructions when the confession incriminates the defendant only by "contextual implication." The Court further argued that a reading of Bruton which encompasses "contextual implication" confessions would harm the efficiency of the criminal justice system more than it would benefit the defendant.
However, the Richardson Court's interpretation of Bruton is erroneous because Bruton was intended to apply to all confessions which were "powerfully incriminating" against the defendant. The Richardson Court failed to recognize that the "powerfully incriminating" standard in Bruton was not limited to "facially incriminating" confessions but rather included all confessions which added substantial weight to the state's case in a form not subject to cross-examination. Furthermore, the Richardson Court's interpretation of Bruton creates the illogical result of admitting a confession which implicates the defendant by "contextual implication" even if it is more devastating than a confession which "facially incriminates" the defendant. Finally, even if the exclusion of confessions which inculpate the defendant by "contextual implication" causes a reduction in the efficiency of the criminal justice system, this price is small compared to the cost of violating an individual's confrontation rights under the sixth amendment.
The effects of the Supreme Court's holding in Richardson v. Marsh are disturbing. The Court's overly narrow interpretation of Bruton will have the unfortunate effect of increasing the chance that a nonconfessing defendant at a joint trial will be prejudiced by evidence which is inadmissible against him. Such an effect is neither dictated by Bruton nor acceptable in our criminal justice system.
